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TAINTED LOVE: WHAT THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
GOT WRONG IN MUTH V. FRANK
INTRODUCTION
Perhaps no taboo is older or more entrenched than the incest ta-
boo.' Nevertheless, the practice of sexual relations between blood rel-
atives is as persistent and powerful as the taboo.2 When one thinks
about incest, many images come to mind. Perhaps it is the relatively
benign image of "kissin' cousins ' 3 in a moonshine-fueled backwoods
pairing. Perhaps it is the sickening thought of the violent sexual abuse
of a child at the hands of her father or brother. Whatever one's initial
impression, people are generally not comfortable talking or thinking
about incest, much less admitting familiarity with it. Incest in
America remains, for the most part, a hidden practice; it has sup-
planted homosexuality as "[t]he love that dare not speak its name."4
1. See generally EMILE DURKHEIM, INCEST: THE NATURE AND ORIGIN OF THE TABOO (Ed-
ward Sagarin trans., Lyle Stuart, Inc. 1963) (1898); SIGMUND FREUD, Three Contributions to the
Theory of Sex, in THE BASIC WRITINGS OF SIGMUND FREUD 551 (Dr. A.A. Brill trans., 1938);
CLAUDE LEvI-STRAUSS, THE ELEMENTARY STRUCTURES OF KINSHIP (Rodney Needham ed.,
James Harle Bell & John Richard von Sturmer trans., Beacon Press 1969) (1949); EDWARD WES-
TERMARCK, THE HISTORY OF HUMAN MARRIAGE (5th ed. 1922).
2. See infra notes 26-47 and accompanying text.
3. The term "kissin' cousins" denotes a rural sensibility, even when not attached to incest per
se. The phrase was used most famously as the title of a 1964 film staring Elvis Presley in dual
roles as a man and his "hayseed" cousin. KISSIN' COUSINS (Warner Brothers Studios 1964). Elvis
Presley also sang a same-titled homage of sorts to the practice of cousin incest in the film:
Kissin's allowed 'cos we're proud to be cousins
What's a little teasin', huggin' and a-squeezin'
Between us cousins.
Oh it's so great to be one big family
And we show it, yes we show it
You see, we never feud, we're a happy brood
Folks all know it, yes they know it...
Honey we dress and we mess
We're just cousins
Cousins, kissin' cousins ....
ELVIS PRESLEY, Kissin' Cousins number 2, on KISSIN' COUSINS/CLAMBAKE/STAY AWAY, JOE
(BMG Records 1994).
4. See MICHAEL S. FOLDY, THE TRIALS OF OSCAR WILDE: DEVIANCE, MORALITY, AND
LATE-VICTORIAN SOCIETY (1997). In (Oscar Wilde's first criminal trial, he stated his famous
defense of homosexuality during cross examination by attorney Charles Gill:
"The love that dare not speak its name" in this century is such a great affection of an
elder for a younger man as there was between David and Jonathan, such as Plato made
the very basis of his philosophy, and such as you find in the sonnets of Michelangelo
and Shakespeare.... It is in this century misunderstood, so much misunderstood that it
may be described as the "Love that dare not speak its name," and on account of it I am
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There is no incest lobby in the halls of Congress, no incest legal de-
fense fund, and no incest pride parade. 5 Incest, as the conventional
wisdom goes, is universally proscribed; it is perversion par excellence.6
It is exactly the kind of behavior that the Constitution does not pro-
tect and criminal law was meant to prohibit. Or is it?
In June 2005, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals decided Muth v.
Frank, a case challenging the constitutionality of Wisconsin's criminal
incest statute.7 Muth involved two blood relatives who did not even
know each other until adulthood, when they met, fell in love, and en-
gaged in sexual relations. 8 They went on to have several children, but
the State of Wisconsin removed the children from their custody and
sentenced them to maximum security prison.9 The couple appealed
their conviction, arguing that after Lawrence v. Texas, private consen-
sual sex between adults cannot be legislatively proscribed in most situ-
ations. 10 The Seventh Circuit disagreed, holding that Lawrence did
not announce a fundamental right to sexual liberty that protected con-
sensual incest. Instead, Lawrence was limited to legislative prohibi-
tions against "homosexual sodomy."" In practical terms, the Muth
decision meant that a consenting, adult couple could have their chil-
dren removed from their care and be placed in prison because, ac-
cording to the Seventh Circuit, Lawrence only protected the right of
two men to engage in anal or oral sex.
This Note explores how the Seventh Circuit erred in its decision in
Muth v. Frank, raising implications beyond the narrow realm of crimi-
nal incest statutes. Part II surveys the historical and contemporary
status of incest in both law and culture, 12 and highlights the cases that
placed where I am now .... The world mocks at it and sometimes puts one in the
pillory for it.
Id. at 117 (citation omitted). The phrase has since been used for decades to refer to the trans-
gressive nature of homosexuality. A recent article about incest offered a humorous play on this
phrase. See William Saletan, The Love That Dare Not Speak Its Surname: What's Wrong With
Marrying Your Cousin?, SLATE, Apr. 10, 2002, http://www.slate.com/id/2064227.
5. See Brett H. McDonnell, Comment, Is Incest Next?, 10 CARDOZO WOMEN'S L.J. 337 (2004)
(noting that the lack of political and popular support for incest differentiates it from sodomy in
important ways). But see Nancy J. White, Kissing Cousins, TORONTO STAR, July 3, 2004, Li
(interviewing a representative of CUDDLE International (Cousins United to Defeat Discrimi-
nating Laws through Education), an organization whose goal is to deal with issues of consan-
guineous marriage).
6. See generally FREUD, supra note 1.
7. 412 F.3d 808, 810 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 575 (2005).
8. Id. at 810-11.
9. See infra notes 121-128 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 131-141 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 137-146 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 20-67 and accompanying text.
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serve as a backdrop to Muth.t 3 Part III explores the Seventh Circuit's
decision in Muth.14 Part IV argues that the Muth court was wrong in
not extending Lawrence to consensual incest, and attacks the tradi-
tional justifications for criminal incest statutes.15 Part V discusses the
potential impact of Muth on other areas of the law, and explores the
ethical and policy implications of the courts' scatter-shot approach to
"sex" jurisprudence. 16 This Note concludes that criminal incest stat-
utes cannot survive even rational basis review.
II. BACKGROUND
Prior to any discussion of the legal arguments concerning criminal
incest statutes, some initial definitions and understandings are in or-
der. This Part reviews the history of incest and describes its various
forms. 17 It also surveys the statistical prevalence of the practice of
incest.' 8 Finally, this Part explores the various legal responses to the
practice of incest and describes the constitutional precedents applica-
ble in Muth v. Frank.19
A. Forms of Incest
There are two different forms of incest, which may require two dif-
ferent legal responses. But before one can differentiate between the
two, and assess the appropriate legal responses to each, it is essential
to know what is meant when courts and legislatures speak of incest in
the law. Incest, like sodomy, is a powerful word, laden with emotion:
it has an amazing ability to mean different things in different con-
texts.20 A less emotional, but nonetheless ambiguous, term is consan-
guinity.21 Consanguinity refers to the degree of blood relation
13. See infra notes 68-112 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 113-146 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 147-252 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 253-259 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 20-43 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 44-47 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 48-67 and accompanying text.
20. "Incest" is defined as "[s]exual relations between family members or close relatives, in-
cluding children related by adoption." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 776 (8th ed. 2004). But as the
remainder of this Note demonstrates, the crime of incest varies from state to state. Likewise,
sodomy was subject to varied interpretations at different times. See generally WILLIAM N. Es-
KRIDGE, JR., GAYLAW: CHALLENGING THE APARTHEID OF THE CLOSET (1999).
21. "Consanguinity" is defined as "[t]he relationship of persons of the same blood or origin."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 20, at 322. "Collateral consanguinity" is defined as "[t]he
relationship between persons who have the same ancestor but do not descend or ascend from
one. another (for example, uncle and nephew, cousins, etc.)." Id. "Lineal consanguinity" is de-
fined as "[t]he relationship between persons who are directly descended or ascended from one
another (for example, mother and daughter, great-grandfather and grandson, etc.)." Id.
2007] 1067
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between two people.2 2 There are various levels of consanguinity, just
as there are skins on an onion; the closer the relation, the greater the
level of consanguinity. "Incest" describes a relationship the govern-
ment has chosen to proscribe, drawing the line somewhere on the skin
of the consanguineous onion., Incest can be defined not only by blood
(consanguinity) but by marriage (affinity).2 3
With those provisional definitions settled, one can turn to the dis-
tinct forms of incest. The first variety can be thought of as "coercive
incest." Coercive incest is the "rape-like" sexual abuse by an adult
parent, relative, or older sibling of a minor child.24 This form of incest
is not the concern of this Note. It can and should remain criminally
sanctioned through existing rape, sexual assault, and molestation
laws.25 The second variety of incest can be termed "consensual in-
cest," or sexual relations between competent, consenting, consanguin-
eous adults. It is this form of incest that is the subject of this Note.
B. Historical Survey of Incest
A brief survey of the history of consensual incest is required to ade-
quately understand Muth and its policy implications, as well as to un-
derstand how common the practice is. A simple recitation of the facts
of Muth, or mere reference'to American law, would fail to give the full
picture.
Incest has ancient roots and persists in every part of the world to
this day, sometimes with a surprising degree of acceptance.26 Incest
has existed since the beginning of time and has meant something very
different to each culture. It is, as one scholar noted, "[s]o widespread
22. One of the most prolific scholars in this area has summarized consanguinity:
As a working definition, unions contracted between persons biologically related as
second cousins (F> 0.0156) are categorized as consanguineous. This arbitrary limit has
been chosen because the genetic influence in marriages between couples related to a
lesser degree would usually be expected to differ only slightly from that observed in the
general population.
A.H. Bittles, A Background Summary of Consanguineous Marriage 2 (Ctr. for Human Genetics
at Edith Cowan Univ., May 2001).
23. See Commonwealth v. Rahim, 805 N.E.2d 13, 15 (Mass. 2004). Rahim held that the Mas-
sachusetts incest statute only criminalized relationships between persons by blood or adoption,
not marriage. Id. The court's opinion provides a searching analysis of the current status of
incest laws based on affinity.
24. Incest predominately occurs in this form. Statistics indicate that 75% of incest occurs
between a parent and child, most of which is perpetrated by an older male relative on a younger
female relative. See Richard Krugman & David P.H. Jones, Incest and Other Forms of Sexual
Abuse, in THE BATrERED CHILD (Ray E. Helfer & Ruth S. Kemp eds., 4th ed. 1987).
25. Wisconsin's statutory regime already criminalizes sexual assault, sexual assault of a child,
and sexual exploitation of a child. WIs. STAT. ANN. §§ 940.225, 948.02, 948.05 (West 2005).
26. See infra notes 29-47 and accompanying text.
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and affectively laden . . . that it is generally regarded . . . [as] the
evolutionary Rubicon of human social life."'27 One could argue that
the first example of incest was Adam copulating with Eve, the very
flesh of his flesh and bone of his bone.28 Even aside from that admit-
tedly conjectural "example," the history and folklore of ancient cul-
tures are rife with examples of consensual incest, indicating that it was
present and even flourishing in those cultures to varying degrees.
For instance, in the folklore of ancient Mesopotamia, the god Enlil
created life on earth by committing incest with his mother, Ki.29 The
myth represented the cultural reality of sexual practices at the time.
Incest was common among the ruling clans of Mesopotamia, who
were permitted to marry and mate consanguineously. 30 In Egypt,
folklore indicates that Tefnut married her brother, the god Shu; their
coupling created Geb and Nut who, in turn, married each other and
had consanguineous offspring of their own.31 Most notable was the
famed relationship between Osiris and his sister Isis, a myth that dates
to at least 3000 B.C.E.32 In terms of actual Egyptian mores and law,
marriage between brothers and sisters was permitted by the Egyp-
tians,33 though it was mostly confined to royal families. 34 In the Near
East, incestuous acts were generally "contrary to the Mosaic Law, '35
but the Old Testament is replete with examples of consensual incest
that went unpunished, and were arguably rewarded.36
In ancient Persia, consanguineous pairings were permitted among
the ruling class, and "certainly were celebrated by the kings at the
Persian court."' 37 In ancient Greece, there is no more infamous exam-
ple of incest than the fateful case of Oedipus and Jocasta. 38 While
marriage between full brother and sister was historically proscribed,
marriage between half-siblings was permitted under Greek law.39 In
Japan, consanguineous marriages at varying levels of relatedness are
27. Seymour Parker, The Waning of the Incest Taboo, 11 LEGAL STUD. F. 205, 206 (1987).
28. Cf. Genesis 20:12.





33. See Russell Middleton, Brother-Sister and Father-Daughter Marriage in Ancient Egypt, 27
AM. Soc. REV. 603, 603 (1962).
34. See id. at 603-05.
35. Adamson, supra note 29, at 86.
36. See generally Genesis 20:12; Leviticus 18:6-18, 20:11-21; Numbers 26:58-59; Deuteronomy
27:22.
37. Adamson, supra note 29, at 86.




more accepted. In Japanese manga and anime, 40 for example, incest is
more frequently, thoroughly, and objectively explored than in the
West.41 Notable instances of consanguineous unions in Western cul-
ture include Charles Darwin and his first cousin Emma Wedgewood,
who had ten children together; Albert Einstein also married his first
cousin. 42 Frequent consanguineous unions occurred within the Roths-
child family and in numerous royal families, most notably the Hap-
sburgs and the royal families of Hawaii. 43
C. Statistical Prevalence of Incest
Statistics show that incest is even more widespread than the anecdo-
tal evidence would indicate. The frequency of consanguineous pair-
ings varies across the world. Consanguineous unions in the
predominately Muslim countries of the Near East, Pakistan, and
North Africa account for 20% of all unions, and in many areas it ex-
ceeds 50%. 44 By contrast, the prevalence of consanguineous unions
between first cousins in North America, Japan, South America and
Western Europe occur in anywhere from 1% to 10% of the popula-
tion.45 Japan, with consanguineous rates traditionally between 6%
and 9%, frequently sees marriages between blood-related aunts and
nephews, as well as first cousins. 46 Accurate statistics on consanguine-
ous sexual relations are, understandably, much harder to obtain.47
Global statistics on the prevalence of blood-related marriage provide
40. "Manga" is the Japanese word for what Americans call "comics." Anime is a form of
Japanese animation, also referred to as portmanteau Japanimation. Anime is typically influ-
enced by manga. See generally GILLES POITRAS, ANIME ESSENTIALS: EVERY THING A FAN
NEEDS TO KNOW (2001); FREDERIK L. SCHODT, MANGA! MANGA!: THE WORLD OF JAPANESE
COMICS (1983).
41. There are a number of notable anime series dealing with incest between major characters,
most often between older brothers and younger sisters. See generally Koi KAZE (Geneon En-
tertainment 2004); MARMALADE Boy (Toei Animation 1994); CREAM LEMON (New Century
1984).
42. See Nikki Racklin, We Are Family, OBSERVER, Dec. 8, 2002, available at http://ob-
server.guardian.co.uk/magazine/story/0,11913,855907,00.html.
43. H.E. Maiden, Historic Genealogy, 4 TRANSACTIONS ROYAL HIST. Soc'Y 103 (1889).
44. See Alan H. Bittles, Empirical Estimates of the Global Prevalence of Consanguineous Mar-
riage in Contemporary Societies 15-18 tbl.1 (Morrison Inst. for Population & Resource Studies
Stanford Univ., Working Paper No. 74, 1998); see also A.H. Bittles, Consanguinity and Its Rele-
vance to Clinical Genetics, 60 CLINICAL GENETICS 89 (2001) [hereinafter Bittles, Clinical Genet-
ics]; Alan H. Bittles, The Role and Significance of Consanguinity as a Demographic Variable, 20
POPULATION & DEV. REV. 561 (1994) [hereinafter Bittles, Demographic Variable].
45. Bittles, Clinical Genetics, supra note 44, at 90.
46. Bittles, Demographic Variable, supra note 44, at 563.




only a rough approximation of what is, potentially, the larger number
of instances of consanguineous sexual relations.
D. Legal Reponses to Incest
Unlike sodomy, incest in England "was originally in the jurisdiction
of the ecclesiastical courts and so has no history at common law."'48
Incest "was given a statutory form in the Punishment of Incest Act" of
1908, which criminalized relations between a man and his daughter,
sister, mother, or granddaughter, but did not criminalize relationships
between an uncle and niece or a stepfather and stepdaughter.49 The
law addressed grandfather and granddaughter relations, while leaving
grandmother and grandson relations unaffected. 50 As in England, in-
cest was not a common-law crime in the United States.51 Utah, for
example, "where the Mormon community did not disapprove of inces-
tuous relationships," did not criminalize incest until 1892.52 Unique in
the English-speaking world, many states eventually added first cousins
to their criminal incest statutes, whereas first-cousin relationships and
marriage have always been legal in England.53 Rhode Island did, at
one point, carve out an exception for Jews to marry first cousins as
permitted by the dictates of their faith.54 Notably, no Western Euro-
pean country appears to prohibit marriage between first cousins, 55 and
first-cousin marriage is also legal throughout Canada and Mexico.56
In Sweden, marriage between half-siblings is permitted under that
country's 1987 Swedish Marriage Law. 57 The United States is the only
Western country with such explicit first-cousin marriage restrictions.58
The inclusion of marriage as a point of reference is important because
criminal incest statutes are often tied to a state's marriage statute; the
48. Id. at 322.
49. Id.
50. See id.
51. Id. at 323.
52. Id.
53. Hughes, supra note 47, at 323.
54. Id. at 323 n.6.
55. See id. at 323.
56. C6digo Civil Federal [C.C.F.] [Federal Civil Code], as amended, Artfculo 156, Diario
Oficial de la Federaci6n [DO.], 12 de Diciembre de 2004 (Mex.); The Marriage (Prohibited
Degrees) Act, 1990 S.C., ch.46 (Can.).
57. MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, FAMILY LAW: INFORMATION ON THE RULES 8 (rev. ed. 2007), avail-
able at http://www.sweden.gov.se/contentll/c6/07/9697142c339cc.pdf.
58. See generally McDonnell, supra note 5.
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crime of incest is frequently determined by reference to the parties
prohibited from marrying.59
In the United States, criminal prohibitions of incest vary wildly.
Rhode Island repealed its incest law altogether in 1989.60 Michigan
and New Jersey make incest "a subcategory of criminal sexual con-
duct" when either party to the relationship is between thirteen and
sixteen years old.61 Interestingly, fewer states forbid incestuous sexual
relations between first cousins than forbade sodomy before Lawrence
v. Texas.62 Wisconsin's incest statute appears to be designed with ge-
netic risks in mind.63 The Kansas incest law, an example of a less
targeted statute, even covers same-sex incest. 64 Florida's law limits its
prohibition of incest to vaginal sex between a man and woman.65 The
Ohio statute does not criminalize incest between adult brothers and
sisters. 66 In its section on criminal incest, the Model Penal Code states
that "[a] person is guilty of incest, a felony of the third degree, if he
knowingly marries or cohabits or has sexual intercourse with an ances-
tor or descendant, a brother or sister of the whole or half blood [or an
uncle, aunt, nephew or niece of the whole blood]. 67
E. Constitutional Precedents
Allen Muth's criminal incest case centered, in large part, on the
meaning of the Supreme Court's decision in Lawrence v. Texas.68
Lawrence is the most recent in a long line of cases involving a "right to
privacy" or "liberty interest" under the Fourteenth Amendment.69 In
Lawrence, the Supreme Court held a Texas sodomy statute unconsti-
tutional. 70 The Texas statute criminalized only homosexual sodomy;
yet the Court did not base its ruling on equal protection grounds,
which would conceivably have permitted a statute applying to both
opposite and same-sex sodomy. 71 Instead, it relied on substantive due
59. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. ANN. § 944.06 (West 2005). Wisconsin's incest statute, for example,
makes incest criminal where the persons are "related in a degree within which the marriage of
the parties is prohibited by the law of this state." Id.
60. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-6-3 (repealed 1989).
61. Leigh B. Bienen, Defining Incest, 92 Nw. U. L. REV. 1501, 1564 (1998).
62. McDonnell, supra note 5, at 350.
63. WiS. STAT. ANN. § 944.06.
64. KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 21-3602 to -3603 (1995).
65. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 826.04 (West 2006).
66. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.03(A)(5) (LexisNexis 2006).
67. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 230.2 (Official Draft and Revised Comments 1980) (alteration
in original).
68. 539 U.S. 558 (2003); see also infra notes 137-146.
69. See infra notes 80-106 and accompanying text.
70. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578-79.
71. Id. at 579-81 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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process. 72 Lawrence explicitly overruled Bowers v. Hardwick, a case
that upheld Georgia's criminal sodomy statute. 73 In striking down the
Texas statute, the Court held that the law violated the petitioner's
"liberty interest. ' 74 Justice Anthony Kennedy, writing for the major-
ity in Lawrence, defined this interest broadly:
Liberty protects the person from unwarranted government intru-
sions into a dwelling or other private places. In our tradition the
State is not omnipresent in the home. And there are other spheres
of our lives and existence, outside the home, where the State should
not be a dominant presence. Freedom extends beyond spatial
bounds. Liberty presumes an autonomy of self that includes free-
dom of thought, belief, expression, and certain intimate conduct.
The instant case involves liberty of the person both in its spatial and
in its more transcendent dimensions.75
Lawrence elaborated upon the fact that the Fourteenth Amendment
provides constitutional protection to personal, intimate decisions re-
lating to areas like marriage, procreation, contraception, family rela-
tionships, childrearing, and education. 76  But in reaching its
conclusion, the majority in Lawrence did not claim that either sex or
"homosexual sodomy" is a "fundamental right," as it often has for
various other asserted rights in Fourteenth Amendment cases.77 The
decision appears to have used a "rational basis" test.78 In its applica-
tion of that test, the Court was persuaded, in part, by the fact that the
Texas sodomy statute was not regularly enforced, and by the fact that
a number of state legislatures had decriminalized the conduct at
issue.79
The import of the decision in Lawrence and the language of that
opinion owe their genesis to the Court's decision in a very different
case. As in Lawrence, the Court's holding in Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey80 was arguably grounded in lib-
erty, not privacy.81 Casey was an abortion decision ratifying the core
holding of Roe v. Wade.82 In an opinion authored in part by Justice
Kennedy, the Court stated, "Neither the Bill of Rights nor the specific
72. Id.
73. Id. at 578 (majority opinion); see also Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
74. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
75. Id. at 562.
76. Id. at 564-66.
77. Id. at 586 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
78. Id.
79. Id. at 581 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
80. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
81. See generally Randy E. Barnett, Justice Kennedy's Libertarian Revolution: Lawrence v.
Texas, in CATO SUPREME COURT REVIEW 2002-2003, at 21 (2003).
82. Casey, 505 U.S. 833.
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practices of States at the time of the adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment marks the outer limits of the substantive sphere of liberty
which the Fourteenth Amendment protects. '83 The Court noted,
"Our obligation is to define the liberty of all, not to mandate our own
moral code." 84
The decisions in Lawrence and Casey seemingly marked a change in
the way the Court analyzed and framed issues concerning privacy, sex,
procreation, and intimacy. Prior to those decisions, the Court applied
a very different analysis to noneconomic liberty or privacy issues, and
frequently framed the issues in a much narrower fashion.
Typically, the Court has used two standards of review in cases adju-
dicating what may be called "substantive due process" rights.85
Where a "fundamental right" is impaired, the state's objective must be
compelling and the means used must be narrowly tailored to meet that
objective. 86 Where no "fundamental right" is implicated, the Court
requires a rational relationship between a legitimate objective and the
means used to effectuate that objective. 87
The first modern example of substantive due process in the area of
noneconomic legislation was the Supreme Court's decision in Gris-
wold v. Connecticut.88 There, the Court struck down a Connecticut
statute that banned both the use of contraceptives and the aiding or
counseling of others in their use.89 In striking down the statute, the
Court found that it violated a constitutionally unenumerated "right to
privacy." 90 The Court identified that right in "specific guarantees in
the Bill of Rights [that] have penumbras, formed by emanations from
those guarantees that help give them life and substance." 91 The
penumbras identified by the Court, according to Justice William
Douglas's opinion, emanated from the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and
Ninth Amendments.92
83. Id. at 848 (emphasis added).
84. Id. at 850 (emphasis added).
85. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 168 (1973) (Stewart, J., concurring) (stating that Griswold
"can be rationally understood only as holding that the Connecticut statute substantively invaded
the 'liberty' that is protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment").
86. See generally Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
87. Id. at 728.
88. 381 U.S. 479 (1965); see also Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
89. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485-86.
90. Id.




Perhaps the most notable instance of substantive due process was
the Supreme Court's 1973 decision in Roe v. Wade.93 In Roe, the
Court held that a woman's "right of privacy" is a "fundamental right"
under the Fourteenth Amendment.94 Justice Blackmun's opinion jet-
tisoned the penumbra theory of Griswold.95 The Court mentioned
Griswold only in passing, and instead focused its ruling on the Four-
teenth Amendment and other privacy-derived decisions such as Pierce
v. Society of Sisters and Meyer v. Nebraska.96
Just over a decade after Roe, the Supreme Court decided Bowers v.
Hardwick.97 Bowers, which was ultimately overturned by Lawrence,
upheld a Georgia statute criminalizing sodomy. 98 The Court defined
the issue as "whether the Federal Constitution confers a fundamental
right upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy." 99 Justice Byron
White, writing for the Court, held that sodomy was not a fundamental
right. 100 The Court stated that the standard for determining whether
an asserted right is fundamental is whether the right is "'implicit in
the concept of ordered liberty,' such that 'neither liberty nor justice
would exist if [they] were sacrificed.' "101 The Court also asserted that
fundamental rights are those which "are deeply rooted in this Nation's
history and tradition. 102 Justice Stevens' dissent, which the Court in
Lawrence adopted, 0 3 argued that "the fact that the governing major-
ity in a State has traditionally viewed a particular practice as immoral
is not a sufficient reason for upholding a law prohibiting the
practice. ' 104
Aside from Bowers, there are other decisions in a seemingly more
restrictive line of cases than Lawrence and Casey. In Washington v.
93. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
94. Id. at 152-53.
95. Id. at 152. Since Roe, the Court has steered clear of relying on the substantive holding of
Griswold.
96. Id. at 152-53; see also Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (holding that
the parent's right to educate one's child as one chooses is protected by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, and that a state law designed to stifle private schools was unconstitutional); Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 401 (1923) (holding that a state law prohibiting children from studying
foreign languages in private schools was unconstitutional).
97. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
98. Id. at 196.
99. Id. at 190.
100. Id. at 191.
101. Id. at 191-92 (alteration in original) (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325, 326
(1937)).
102. Id. at 192 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431
U.S. 494, 503 (1977)).
103. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 577-78 (2003).
104. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 216 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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Glucksberg, the Court refused to find a right to commit physician-
assisted suicide. 10 5 In Michael H. v. Gerald D., the Court denied the
right of a natural father to be recognized as the legal father of his
child. 10 6 One can see that in prior cases concerning issues of sex, mar-
riage, and procreation, the Court has almost always focused on "fun-
damental rights" generally, and often the putative "right to privacy"
specifically.' 0 7 Certain rights, such as marriage, abortion, and contra-
ception, were held to be fundamental; other rights, such as physician-
assisted suicide, sodomy, and certain parental rights, were not. 08
Various scholars, and sometimes the Court itself, have also argued
that, instead of relying on substantive due process, the Ninth Amend-
ment could provide the proper textual basis for cases involving per-
sonal liberty and privacy rights.10 9 But that approach has failed to
garner any support from the Court for nearly fifty years." 0 A more
fruitful area may be an analysis not moored to the constitutional text
itself, but instead based on what has been termed the "police power"
of the state."' Some First Amendment cases mirror this analysis. In
Stanley v. Georgia, for example, the Court held that mere possession
of obscene material was not properly prohibited by the State because
the private, noncommercial, nonharmful activity of a person in his
home is generally free from government regulation.11 2 Part IV ex-
plores in greater detail the Fourteenth Amendment analysis as applied
in Muth, as well as a potential "police power" argument that was not
raised by the parties.
III. SUBJECT OPINION: MUTH V. FRANK
Dorothy and Ernest Muth had, by differing accounts, either nine or
fourteen children. 113 Their youngest, Patty, was born in Milwaukee,
105. 521 U.S. 702, 735-36 (1997).
106. 491 U.S. 110, 131-32 (1989). Justice Antonin Scalia, writing for the majority, stated that
the Court's analysis should "refer to the most specific level at which a relevant tradition protect-
ing, or denying protection to, the asserted right can be identified." Id. at 127 n.6.
107. See supra notes 88-104 and accompanying text.
108. See supra notes 88-106 and accompanying text.
109. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 491-93 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring). See
generally Randy E. Barnett, Reconceiving the Ninth Amendment, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1988)
(arguing that state governments may not violate unenumerated rights); Mark C. Niles, Ninth
Amendment Adjudication: An Alternative to Substantive Due Process Analysis of Personal Au-
tonomy Rights, 48 UCLA L. REV. 85 (2000) (same).
110. See Barnett, supra note 109, at 4; Niles, supra note 109, at 95.
111. See generally Barnett, supra note 109 (arguing that conceiving of constitutional rights as
constraining the exercise of state power is in accord with the intention of the Founders).
112. 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969).
113. Daniel Voll, An American Family, ESQUIRE, July 1998, at 122, 124.
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Wisconsin in 1967.114 Three months after her birth, she was placed in
foster care and eventually adopted 11 5 Allen, the eldest of the Muth
children, is fifteen years older than Patty and spent much of his child-
hood in a Milwaukee County orphanage.11 6 The seven other Muth
siblings were scattered throughout Wisconsin.1 7 Allen and Patty did
not know each other until they met after Patty's high school gradua-
tion, when she was eighteen years old and he was thirty-two.11 8 Allen
and Patty fell in love immediately; Patty got pregnant, and they even-
tually had four children together. 19 Allen and Patty were not origi-
nally aware that they were full brother and sister, but they continued
their relationship and had more children even after they learned the
truth. 20 The State of Wisconsin petitioned to terminate their parental
rights because of the incestuous nature of their parenthood.1 21 A Wis-
consin court granted termination of their parental rights in In re Tif-
fany Nicole M.12 2 Allen and Patricia Muth appealed, challenging the
constitutionality of the Wisconsin statute, which permits termination
of parental rights upon a showing of incestuous parenthood. 23 The
Wisconsin Supreme Court denied review.1 24
Hoping for leniency from the court, Patty agreed to be sterilized. 2 5
In 1997, after the termination of their parental rights, Allen and Patty
Muth were convicted under Wisconsin's criminal incest statute.12 6
Despite the fact that she had been sterilized, Patty was sent to a maxi-
mum security prison. 127 Allen Muth was sentenced to eight years in a
maximum security prison twenty-five miles away.' 28 The prosecutor
in Milwaukee reportedly stated that she did not "care[ ] if Patty and
Allen screwed naked on Wisconsin Avenue, as long as they didn't
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 124-25.
117. Id. at 124.
118. Id. at 125.
119. See Voll, supra note 113, at 127-28 (stating that the Muths had four children together);
see also Jeff Jacoby, Hypocrisy on Adult Consent, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 28, 2005, at Cl (same).
120. Mary Beth Murphy, Brother, Sister Lose Parental Rights to Son, MILWAUKEE J. SENTI-
NEL, Feb. 11, 1997, available at http://findarticles.comlp/articles/mi-qn4196/is_19970211/
ai-n10309613.
121. In re Tiffany Nicole M., 571 N.W.2d 872, 873 (Wis. Ct. App. 1997).
122. Id.
123. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 48.415(7) (West 2003 & Supp. 2006).
124. See Muth v. Frank, 412 F.3d 808, 810 (7th Cir.) (providing the procedural history in the
lower courts), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 575 (2005).






have children. ' 129 During their imprisonment, Allen and Patty en-
dured threats and taunting by day and wrote each other by night.130
Allen Muth challenged his incest conviction before a Wisconsin
Court of Appeals, arguing that the statute was an unconstitutional
criminalization of a sexual relationship between consenting adults.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court denied Muth's petition for discretion-
ary review, 131 and the case proceeded to the District Court for the
Eastern District of Wisconsin. 132 After that court denied his petition
for habeas corpus, Muth appealed to the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals.133
The Wisconsin criminal incest statute that Allen Muth challenged
states as follows:
Whoever marries or has nonmarital sexual intercourse with a per-
son he or she knows is a blood relative and such relative is in fact
related in a degree within which the marriage of the parties is pro-
hibited by the law of this state is guilty of a Class F felony. 134
The pertinent marriage statute prohibits marriages between "persons
who are nearer of kin than 2nd cousins," with an exception for first
cousins if the female is over fifty-five years old or either party is per-
manently sterile. 135 "Sexual intercourse" is defined by Wisconsin stat-
utes as "vulvar penetration and does not require emission."'1 36
The Seventh Circuit, in an opinion written by Judge Daniel Manion,
stated that Lawrence had held only that states could not "enact laws
that criminalize homosexual sodomy" between consenting adults. 137
The court stated that "Lawrence... did not announce... a fundamen-
tal right, protected by the Constitution, for adults to engage in all
manner of consensual sexual conduct, specifically in this case, in-
cest.' a38 Judge Manion noted that Lawrence made "no mention of in-
cest, 1 39 and insisted that "Lawrence, whatever its ramifications, [did]
not, in and of itself, go so far."'1 40 The court summarized its reasoning:
Given, therefore, the specific focus in Lawrence on homosexual sod-
omy, the absence from the Court's opinion of its own "established
129. Id. at 127.
130. Id. at 145.
131. State v. Muth, No. 98-1137-CR (Wis. Ct. App. May 23, 2000).
132. Muth v. State, No. 01-C-0398, 2003 WL 24272406 (E.D. Wis. Oct. 3, 2003).
133. Muth v. Frank, 412 F.3d 808 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 575 (2005).
134. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 944.06 (West 2005).
135. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 765.03(1) (West 2001 & Supp. 2006).
136. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 939.22(36) (West 2005).






method" for resolving a claim that a particular practice implicates a
fundamental liberty interest, and the absence of strict scrutiny re-
view, we conclude that Lawrence did not announce a fundamental
right of adults to engage in all forms of private consensual sexual
conduct. 141
Judge Terence Evans concurred with the judgment of the court but
wrote separately because he "sense[d] a certain degree of unease,
even disdain, for the majority opinion in Lawrence.142 He noted that
the majority's numerous citations to Justice Antonin Scalia's dissent in
Lawrence were, in his opinion, "unnecessary." 143 In fact, Muth cited
Justice Scalia's dissent in Lawrence almost as many times as it did the
majority opinion. Judge Evans' concurrence also objected to what he
perceived as the "repetitive" paraphrasing of the Texas statute: "As I
see it, the term 'homosexual sodomy' is pejorative. It should be
scrubbed from court decisions in the future. ' 144 But Judge Evans felt
that extending Lawrence to protect incest "demeans the importance of
its holding which deals a fatal blow to criminal laws aimed at punish-
ing homosexuals.' 1 45 Like the majority, Judge Evans did not believe
that Lawrence could be extended to the conduct at issue in Muth. He
concluded by stating, "Certain varieties of sexual conduct clearly re-
main outside the reach of Lawrence, things like prostitution, public
sex, nonconsensual sex, sex involving children, and certainly incest, a
condition universally subject to criminal prohibitions."' 46
IV. ANALYSIS
Muth v. Frank was wrongly decided. The Seventh Circuit erred by
holding that Allen Muth's private, consensual sexual relations could
be proscribed by the state. The court compounded that error by find-
ing that his actions were not protected under the Supreme Court's
decision in Lawrence v. Texas. This Part argues that Lawrence is ap-
plicable to private consensual incest between adults.147 Even if Law-
rence were not applicable to Allen Muth's case, the court should have
asked whether Muth's conduct was properly criminalized under Wis-
consin's police power.148 Under either a Fourteenth Amendment or
"police power" analysis, there is no legitimate state interest in the
141. Id. at 818.
142. Id. at 819 (Evans, J., concurring).




147. See infra notes 151-188 and accompanying text.
148. See infra notes 247-252 and accompanying text.
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criminal sanctioning of private, consensual, noncommercial,
nonharmful sexual relations of two competent adults.149 Even more
problematic is the fact that Wisconsin's statute distinguishes between
the various forms of incest on the basis of an outdated understanding
of science. 150
A. Looking for Lawrence in All the Wrong Places
The most egregious error in Muth was the Seventh Circuit's reading
of Lawrence v. Texas. Perhaps more troubling than the tragic out-
come of the decision is that the court's interpretation of Lawrence
stands precedent on its head, setting back the "liberty interest" of all
citizens, not just those engaging in incestuous sexual relations. The
opinion is an example of a court acting more from fear and loathing
than legal principle and dispassionate objectivity.151 The court in
Muth held that "Lawrence... did not announce .. .a fundamental
right, protected by the Constitution, for adults to engage in all manner
of consensual sexual conduct, specifically in this case, incest. ' 152 That
statement is true enough: Lawrence did not explicitly announce a
"fundamental right" to "all manner of consensual sexual conduct,' 53
nor did it announce a "fundamental right" to engage in "homosexual
sodomy." Nevertheless, the Supreme Court invalidated the Texas
sodomy statute, finding that the practice of sodomy by gay persons
can be part of their larger, constitutionally protected liberty
interest. 154
The Court in Lawrence announced that "the fact that the governing
majority in a State has traditionally viewed a particular practice as
immoral is not a sufficient reason for upholding a law prohibiting the
149. See infra notes 194-199 and 216-220 and accompanying text.
150. See infra notes 200-215 and accompanying text.
151. Judge Richard Posner recognized the relative ignorance and discomfort of judges when
adjudicating cases involving sexual matters:
[J]udges know next to nothing about the subject [of sex] beyond their own personal
experience, which is limited, perhaps more so than average, because people with irregu-
lar sex lives are pretty much (not entirely, of course) screened out of the judiciary-
especially the federal judiciary, with its elaborate preappointment investigations ....
This screening ... is a residue of the nation's puritan-more broadly of its Christian-
heritage.
RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON 1 (1992).
152. Muth v. Frank, 412 F.3d 808, 817 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 575 (2005).
153. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 586 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Though there is
discussion of 'fundamental proposition[s],' and 'fundamental decisions,' nowhere does the
Court's opinion declare that homosexual sodomy is a 'fundamental right' under the Due Process
Clause; nor does it subject the Texas law to the standard of review that would be appropriate
(strict scrutiny) if homosexual sodomy were a 'fundamental right."' (citations omitted)).
154. Id. at 578-79 (majority opinion).
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practice." 155 The Court explained the liberty interest at stake: "Lib-
erty protects the person from unwarranted government intrusions ....
Freedom extends beyond spatial bounds. Liberty presumes an auton-
omy of self that includes ... certain intimate conduct. '156
The Court stated that laws like the Texas sodomy statute "touch[]
upon the most private human conduct, sexual behavior," and "seek to
control a personal relationship that, whether or not entitled to formal
recognition in the law, is within the liberty of persons to choose with-
out being punished as criminals.1 57 That principle "should counsel
against attempts by the State, or a court, to define the meaning of the
relationship or to set its boundaries absent injury to a person or abuse
of an institution the law protects."'1 58 The Court defined the issue as
"whether the majority may use the power of the State to enforce [its]
views on the whole society through operation of the criminal law,"
and rejected that contention altogether.1 59
The court in Muth was not faced with narrow precedent; the Law-
rence decision is broadly and generously written. Yet even with that
expansive language from Lawrence to guide it, the court in Muth
stated that consanguineous people engaging in consensual sex are not
the beneficiaries of that decision: "Lawrence, whatever its ramifica-
tions, does not, in and of itself, go so far. ' 160 But courts do not fre-
quently "go so far"; that is, in part, why appellate courts exist-to
faithfully apply prior law to new cases and extend them where appro-
priate.1 6' Yet in the court's narrow view, the only precedent to be
gleaned from Lawrence is that "a state cannot enact laws that
criminalize homosexual sodomy.' 62 Such a narrow interpretation is
arguably more in tune with the discredited, and-discarded jurispru-
dence that produced Bowers than that which yielded Lawrence.163
155. Id. at 577 (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 216 (1986)).
156. Id. at 562.
157. Id. at 567.
158. Id.
159. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 571.
160. Muth v. Frank, 412 F.3d 808, 817 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 575 (2005).
161. Lawrence itself is an example. The Court did not limit the reach of prior cases to abor-
tion or contraception. Rather, the Court acknowledged, "There are broad statements of the
substantive reach of liberty under the Due Process Clause in earlier cases." Lawrence, 539 U.S.
at 564. The Court went on to note that, beginning with Griswold and then extending through
Roe, Carey, and Casey, the Court has increasingly acknowledged that "the protection of liberty
under the Due Process Clause has a substantive dimension of fundamental significance in defin-
ing the rights of the person." Id. at 565.
162. Muth, 412 F.3d at 817.
163. It was the Bowers Court that engaged in an ultra-specific and narrow review of the Geor-
gia sodomy law at issue in that case, an approach that was explicitly disavowed in Lawrence: "To
say that the issue in Bowers was simply the right to engage in certain sexual conduct demeans the
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The court in Muth redefined the issue in Lawrence with a specificity
that is wholly incompatible with the language, tenor, and tone of the
decision. 164
Beyond the dismissive statements that summarily precluded Allen
Muth from availing himself of Lawrence, the court failed to differenti-
ate sodomy from incest or explain how and why the benefit of Law-
rence is unavailable to Allen Muth. 165 Judge Manion's opinion made
no attempt to explain why incest may be proscribed and sodomy may
not. 166 In other words, the court in Muth distinguished Lawrence on
the seemingly self-evident grounds that incest is not "homosexual sod-
omy," and even if it were, the magic words "fundamental right" were
never applied to sodomy. 167 Even if Lawrence had announced a fun-
damental right, it would have made no difference, because Lawrence
was concerned only with "homosexual sodomy" and not incest.
In a single paragraph that used the phrase "homosexual sodomy"
no less than four times in describing Lawrence, the court noted that
since Allen Muth was not convicted for "homosexual sodomy," he
could not avail himself of Lawrence.168 Had Allen Muth had sex with
his brother and not his sister, the court would have had to reconcile
the fact that homosexual sodomy can also be incestuous, which may
have forced the court to address the issue of consensual incest with
more subtlety.
That leads one to wonder whether the hypothetically gay Allen
Muth posited above, who engaged in consensual adult sodomy with
claim the individual put forward, just as it would demean a married couple were it to be said
marriage is simply about the right to have sexual intercourse." Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567.
164. Various scholars would likely not agree with the reading of Lawrence advanced here. For
instance, Professor Cass Sunstein has argued that Lawrence is not nearly so broad, and instead
stands for the principle that statutes like the Texas sodomy statute are unconstitutional, not
because they intrude on behavior that does not harm a third party, but because they "intrude[ ]
on private sexual conduct without having significant moral grounding in existing public commit-
ments." Cass R. Sunstein, What Did Lawrence Hold? Of Autonomy, Desuetude, Sexuality, and
Marriage, in 2003 THE SUPREME COURT REVIEW 27, 30 (Dennis J. Hutchison et al. eds., 2004)
(emphasis omitted). However accurate Sunstein's reading of Lawrence is, the Seventh Circuit's
depiction of the issue as homosexual sodomy versus incest is untenable. The Court in Lawrence
was not concerned with sodomy as an act, but rather sodomy as a means of expressing a person's
intimate feelings. As the Lawrence decision itself noted, "When sexuality finds overt expression
in intimate conduct with another person, the conduct can be but one element in a personal bond
that is more enduring." Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567.
165. Judge Manion's opinion implicitly dismissed the necessity of making such a differentia-
tion by concluding, "The ultimate question then is ... whether Muth is a beneficiary of the rule
Lawrence announced. He is not. Lawrence did not address the constitutionality of incest stat-
utes." Muth, 412 F.3d at 817.
166. See id. at 816-18.
167. See supra notes 137-141 and accompanying text.
168. Muth, 412 F.3d at 817.
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his brother and was convicted under a state incest statute, could then
avail himself of Lawrence before the Seventh Circuit. 69 If not, then
Lawrence does not really mean what the Supreme Court said it
meant, 170 and the Seventh Circuit would have some explaining to do.
The Muth court's persistent use of the phrase "homosexual sod-
omy," seven times in two pages, seems disingenuous. It seems de-
signed to bolster the court's finding of a "specific focus in Lawrence
on homosexual sodomy, ' 171 despite the fact that Justice Kennedy's
lengthy opinion used the term only twice in nearly twenty pages.172
Judge Evans objected to the repeated use of the term; Judge Manion
responded by counting the number of times the Lawrence court used
the phrase "homosexual sodomy," although he also included refer-
ences to "sodomy," whether attached to the word "homosexual" or
not.173
The Muth court continued its opinion by noting that "[t]here is no
mention of incest in the Court's opinion. ' 174 The court was indeed
correct; Lawrence does not mention incest, nor does Lawrence ad-
dress any of the other genres of sexual conduct engaged in by con-
senting adults in the privacy of their homes.1 75 It is not necessary that
the Supreme Court do so in order for a lower court to fairly apply
Lawrence as precedent and connect the inferential and jurisprudential
dots.176 Courts of appeal have been able to read the Supreme Court
"tea leaves" with astounding alacrity for years in any number of areas
169. See supra note 162 and accompanying text. The Wisconsin criminal incest statute, requir-
ing sexual intercourse with vulvar penetration, would preclude the state from prosecuting gay
incest. See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 944.06 (West 2005). However, if Allen Muth was a citizen of
Kansas, he could be prosecuted for gay incest. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3602 (West 2002).
170. See supra notes 68-79 and accompanying text. The court in Lawrence did not hold that
only some types of homosexual sodomy are protected.
171. Muth, 412 F.3d at 818.
172. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 569, 570 (2003). Justice O'Connor's concurrence, a
much shorter opinion, used the term four times. Justice Scalia's dissent used the term sixteen
times.
173. See Muth, 412 F.3d at 812 n.4. In a footnote, Judge Manion defended his position:
In his concurring opinion, our colleague suggests that the term "homosexual sodomy"
is used by this court in a pejorative fashion. Use of the word sodomy or "homosexual
sodomy" to discuss the sexual conduct Lawrence addressed is not original to this deci-
sion. The majority opinion in Lawrence used the term "sodomy" no less than seventeen
times and the phrase "homosexual sodomy" twice.
Id. Judge Manion went on to cite three other post-Lawrence federal cases where the term "ho-
mosexual sodomy" had been used. Id. (citing Williams v. Attorney Gen. of Ala., 378 F.3d 1232,
1236 (11th Cir. 2004); D.L.S. v. Utah, 374 F.3d 971, 975 (10th Cir. 2004); Anderson v. Morrow,
371 F.3d 1027, 1034 n.4 (9th Cir. 2004)).
174. Id. at 817.
175. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558.
176. This was the very basis for Justice Scalia's dissent in Lawrence; he feared how it would be
applied in future cases. See id. at 604 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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of law. The fact that a decision failed to account for every possible
contingency and permutation has rarely, if ever, prevented the lower
courts from extending the Supreme Court's holdings. 177
The Seventh Circuit concluded its opinion by reiterating its percep-
tion of Lawrence's "specific focus in Lawrence on homosexual sod-
omy. 178 That conclusion advances a highly questionable understand-
ing of Lawrence. As already noted, one finds the phrase "homosexual
sodomy" used only twice by the Lawrence majority. 179 Any "specific
focus" on that act or behavior seems to be on the part of the Seventh
Circuit. Furthermore, the Lawrence decision focused on liberty, not
on a particular form of sexual relations. 180
Finally, Judge Manion's claim that the absence of the indicia of a
fundamental right from the Court's opinion makes Lawrence inappli-
cable to Allen Muth's case is specious. The strict scrutiny/fundamen-
tal right argument Judge Manion's opinion relied on was drawn from
Justice Scalia's dissent in Lawrence. 8" Moreover, the Muth decision
resuscitated several other cases 182 that seem anachronistic in light of
Lawrence; it relied on the Eleventh Circuit's own narrow reading of
Lawrence from a 2004 case involving gay and lesbian adoption in Flor-
ida.' 83 The Muth decision cited to that Eleventh Circuit decision three
times, including several substantial quotations. 184 That the Seventh
Circuit arguably adjudicated Allen Muth's case on the basis of Justice
Scalia's dissent in Lawrence, and the Eleventh Circuit's reading of
Lawrence in an entirely distinguishable case, is highly troublesome.
One would expect the court to apply Lawrence to the case before it
and attempt some showing of analogy or distinction, rather than apply
a secondhand interpretation from an inapposite case, hybridized with
the views of the primary dissenter in Lawrence.
177. Justice Scalia's dissent in Lawrence has been criticized for falsely engaging in a "slippery
slope" analysis, forecasting the possibility that the courts would be compelled to invalidate state
laws concerning incest, fornication, bestiality, prostitution, etc. See infra note 227 and accompa-
nying text. He was undoubtedly correct to some degree when writing about those laws: "[They
are] sustainable only in light of Bowers' validation of laws based on moral choices. Every single
one of these laws is called into question by today's decision; the Court makes no effort to cabin
the scope of its decision to exclude them from its holding." Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 590 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting). Justice Scalia thus recognized that other courts could rely upon Lawrence in areas
beyond homosexual sodomy.
178. Muth, 412 F.3d at 818.
179. See supra note 172 and accompanying text.
180. See supra note 68-76 and accompanying text.
181. See Muth, 412 F.3d at 817.
182. Id. (citing Washington v. Glucksburg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997); Carey v. Population Servs.
Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977)).
183. Lofton v. Sec'y of the Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804 (11th Cir. 2004).
184. Muth, 412 F.3d at 818 (citing Lofton, 358 F.3d 804).
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The Seventh Circuit's decision is but one more example of the bat-
tle between defining a particular liberty interest with relative specific-
ity or generality that Lawrence arguably rendered irrelevant, or at
least permanently altered. That the Lawrence Court did not classify
sodomy as a "fundamental right" is of little moment. Jurisprudence is
not witchcraft; there are no special incantations that must be faithfully
chanted. It is a matter of reasoning and logic, both deductive and in-
ductive. By not following the broad principles in Lawrence, the Sev-
enth Circuit disingenuously ignored what Lawrence actually stood for.
Muth used the shaky foundation of Justice Scalia's dissent, along with
choice quotations taken out of context, to cast Lawrence as a typical,
run-of-the-mill, rational basis case. 185
The Seventh Circuit made much of the fact that Lawrence "did not
apply the specific method it had previously created for determining
whether a substantive due process claim implicated a fundamental
right. ' 186 Judge Richard Posner, himself a member of the Seventh
Circuit, recognized what the panel in Muth failed to appreciate: ra-
tional basis review "is not in fact a single standard,"'t8 7 and appellate
courts "should follow what the Supreme Court does and not just what
it says it is doing."1 88 In Muth, the Seventh Circuit did exactly the
opposite; it followed exactly what the Supreme Court did not do and
did not say.
B. Sodomy Statutes and Incest Statutes:
The Numbers Game
Conspicuous in its absence from the Seventh Circuit's decision is an
analysis comparing criminal incest laws to criminal sodomy laws. The
Lawrence opinion directed a great deal of attention to the fact that
numerous states had repealed their criminal sodomy statutes.189 This
was, for the Court in Lawrence, vital and persuasive evidence of the
185. The Seventh Circuit relied upon Justice Scalia's dissent for guidance regarding Lawrence.
In light of Justice Scalia's self-evident hostility toward the majority's decision in that case, relying
upon his dissent arguably reflects an unease or displeasure with the Lawrence holding. The
court also cherry-picked two quotations from Carey and Glucksburg that were irrelevant to both
Muth and Lawrence. See id. at 817.
186. Id.
187. Civil Liberties for Urban Believers v. City of Chicago, 342 F.3d 752, 768 (7th Cir. 2003)
(Posner, J., dissenting) (citing City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432
(1985)).
188. Id. at 769.
189. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 572-73 (2003). The Lawrence decision noted that
prior to 1961, all fifty states outlawed sodomy. The Court also reflected upon the fact that "[tihe
25 States with laws prohibiting the relevant conduct referenced in the Bowers decision are re-
duced now to 13, of which 4 enforce their laws only against homosexual conduct." Id. at 573.
2007] 1085
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
unsustainability of those laws. 190 As one commentator noted, "At the
time the Model Penal Code was drafted, eighteen states prohibited
sex between first cousins, and that number has now dropped to eight.
Thus, incest between first cousins today is forbidden by fewer states
than forbade sodomy before Lawrence."'191 If the number of states
moving toward decriminalization was an important factor in Law-
rence, it is curious that the court in Muth did not even attempt to
survey the current state of criminal incest laws.192 Not only have a
number of states decriminalized various forms of incest, but the over-
all trend has been persistently toward decriminalization. 193 The Sev-
enth Circuit made no mention of this.
C. The Abuse Excuse
Some critics have argued that criminal incest statutes exist to pro-
hibit intrafamilial sexual abuse, a concern not present in Lawrence.
This argument may justify prohibiting the coercive sexual abuse of a
minor child, 194 but not adult consensual incest. In any event, it bears
noting that the narrow definitions of criminal incest that currently ex-
ist in many states (e.g., penile-vaginal sexual intercourse) suggest that
such laws are underinclusive. 195 Certainly a statute prohibiting penile-
vaginal intercourse but permitting other sexual activities is not really
advancing the goal of curtailing sexual abuse. 196 The purported ratio-
nale of preventing abuse is unpersuasive because brother-sister or fa-
ther-daughter incest is permitted in many states, provided the parties
are not related by blood. 197 In a handful of states, certain forms of
incest are even permitted despite the existence of a blood relation-
ship.' 98 Intrafamilial sexual abuse of minors is addressed most fre-
quently and properly through state laws against sexual assault,
molestation, and rape.199 Finally, Wisconsin already has a criminal
statute that specifically addresses incest with a child.
190. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
191. McDonnell, supra note 5, at 350.
192. See Muth, 412 F.3d 808.
193. McDonnell, supra note 5, at 350.
194. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
195. See supra notes 60-67 and accompanying text.
196. The criminal incest law of Florida makes reference to penile-vaginal intercourse, but
would leave unpunished, at least under its incest law, intrafamilial fellatio and sodomy. FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 826.04 (West 2006).
197. See supra note 23 and accompanying text. In states like Massachusetts, relation by affm-
ity does not come within the scope of criminal incest statutes.
198. McDonnell, supra note 5, at 361-63 tbl.1.
199. See infra note 25 and accompanying text.
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D. Eugen(et)ics and Health: The Irrational Basis
In addition to abuse, the most persistent rationales offered for crim-
inal incest laws are the genetic and health arguments. As these lines
of argument go, incest may be properly proscribed because of the del-
eterious health effects on incestuous progeny. 2°° But the genetic ra-
tionale is backward. The mere fact that a child is born with recessive
genetic traits because of his or her incestuous parentage is wholly un-
remarkable; numerous children with recessive genetic traits are born
every hour of the day from nonincestuous unions. Society would not
likely say that their parents should be criminalized for having
parented with the advance knowledge that the child may be at risk for
greater health risks.201 Wisconsin does not require nonconsanguine-
ous parents with a history of sickle cell anemia, Tay-Sachs, cystic fibro-
sis, or Huntington's disease to be sterilized before they can have
sexual relations.20 2 Moreover, Wisconsin has not as yet placed parents
who carry those genetic traits in prison for having sexual intercourse.
The first exhaustive analyses of the effects of human "inbreeding"
began in the middle of the last century.203 That research demon-
strated that consanguineous unions were pervasive across
demographics of religious and socioeconomic backgrounds. 20 4 Alan
Bittles, a leading scholar in the study of consanguinity, noted this
phenomenon:
Despite the widespread belief that fertility is reduced in consanguin-
eous unions, studies conducted in a wide range of populations have
reported reduced levels of pathological sterility, and no evidence of
an increase in fetal loss rates. Indirect indicators of fetal survival,
such as multiple birth rates and the secondary sex ratio, also failed
to show an inbreeding effect.205
Moreover, in some cases, consensual incest may actually decrease the
risk of certain diseases.
One study has shown that consanguineous parentage may decrease
the risk of certain lymphoid malignancies like breast cancer.20 6 The
study demonstrated that consanguinity "may decrease the frequency
200. A.H. Bittles, Incest Re-assessed, 280 NATURE 107 (1979).
201. Id.
202. See id. Tay-Sachs, for example, presents a 50% risk of transmission to child from par-
ent-lower than incest risks, generally. See National Tay-Sachs & Allied Diseases Association,
Inc., Modes of Inheritance, http://www.ntsad.org/S02/S02modes.htm (last visited May 23, 2007).
203. Bittles, Demographic Variable, supra note 44.
204. Bittles, Clinical Genetics, supra note 44.
205. Id. at 92 (citations omitted).
206. S. Denic & A. Bener, Consanguinity Decreases Risk of Breast Cancer-Cervical Cancer
Unaffected, 85 BRIT. J. CANCER 1675 (2001).
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of recessive tumour genes, theoretically, leading to a lower incidence
of cancer in a consanguineous population." 207 There has also been
little evidence showing a correlation between consanguinity and spon-
taneous abortion or miscarriage.208 It appears from the data that "un-
less deleterious recessive genes are operational very early in
pregnancy, in effect before the first missed menstrual period, consan-
guinity does not appear to adversely influence the incidence of prena-
tal losses. ' 20 9 When consanguinity does lead to adverse health effects,
it is due to the "expression of rare, recessive genes inherited from a
common ancestor. ' 210 As Bittles has noted, "[t]oo often there has
been uncritical acceptance of data purporting to demonstrate the ac-
tion of deleterious recessive genes, despite a lack of information on
the comparative socioeconomic profiles of consanguineous and non-
consanguineous groups. '211 In terms of major congenital malforma-
tions that are purportedly higher in consanguineous progeny, too
many of the studies fail to discriminate between genetic and
nongenetic determinants of morbidity. 212 In consanguineous pairings,
there is also the increased probability that positive recessive traits will
be expressed. 213 The genetic "dangers" of first-cousin consanguineous
unions producing "damaged" progeny is probably not higher than
nonconsanguineous couplings.214 The risk of inherited diseases such
as cystic fibrosis, muscular dystrophy, sickle cell anemia, and Hunting-
ton's disease is actually higher than the risk of serious birth defect in
consanguineous progeny.215 Wisconsin has not passed legislation to
prevent these parents from having children. Additionally, it would be
difficult for Wisconsin to assert genetics as a rationale when, by the
plain terms of the statutory code, it criminalizes even consanguineous
sexual intercourse without emission.
E. Morality Is "Rationally Related" to Nothing
Having demonstrated that the abuse and genetic rationales for
criminal incest laws will not suffice, one is left with one other ratio-
207. Id. at 1675.
208. See Bittles, Demographic Variable, supra note 44, at 568.
209. Id. at 569.
210. Id. at 571.
211. Id. at 572.
212. Id. at 572-74.
213. Id.
214. See Robin L. Bennett et al., Genetic Counseling and Screening of Consanguineous
Couples and Their Offspring: Recommendations of the National Society of Genetic Counselors,




nale-morality. Many laws appear to be based on morality, but one
can easily discern a nonmoral justification for those laws.21 6 The justi-
fications vary, but at their root is the idea that once a person's liberty
transgresses another person's liberty, it has changed into license,
which the state may proscribe.217
That the legislature of Texas found homosexual sodomy "immoral"
was not enough to sustain that law; so, too, moral disapproval of sex-
ual relations between adults related by blood cannot suffice.218 Fur-
ther, even if Wisconsin argued that its incest statute serves to foster
morality, that argument would be plainly and demonstrably false. For
example, Wisconsin's statute permits two adult blood brothers or sis-
ters to have sex with each other.219 It would also permit a seventy-
year-old uncle or aunt to have sex with their eighteen-year-old niece
or nephew.220 The possible amorous permutations are nearly inex-
haustible. One can easily see, then, that Wisconsin's criminal incest
statute is not concerned with fostering any meaningful kind of "moral-
ity." And yet, just as with the rationales of genetics and intrafamilial
abuse, the Muth court made no attempt to determine the relationship
between the law and morality. This is most likely because the court
would have no facts to rely upon. In other words, if one purpose of
the criminal incest statute is to foster morality, and that purpose is
legitimate (which is questionable after Lawrence), there is no way the
court could ever determine that the law was improper: the very fact
that it was enacted justifies its moral purpose and existence. Moral
notions are slippery and slender reeds to hang a decision on, precisely
because they satisfy rational basis analysis by their very nature.
216. For example, one need not be "morally" opposed to prostitution to appreciate that its
practice implicates commercial and economic concerns that may, perhaps, justify its regulation.
217. See Barnett, supra note 81, at 37 ("Liberty is and always has been the properly defined
exercise of freedom. Liberty is and always has been constrained by the rights of others. No
one's genuine right to liberty is violated by restricting his or her freedom to rape or murder,
because there is no such right in the first place.").
218. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 577-78 (2003). The court, adopting Justice Stevens'
language from the Bowers decision, stated, "[T]he fact that the governing majority in a State has
traditionally viewed a particular practice as immoral is not a sufficient reason for upholding a
law prohibiting the practice." Id. at 577 (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 216 (1986)
(Stevens, J., dissenting)).
219. See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 944.06 (West 2005). Gay incest is left entirely unsanctioned by the
Wisconsin statute.
220. Id. Not only would gay incest be permissible, but it seems coercive gay incest between an




F. Wisconsin's Statute Cannot Survive Even a
Rational Basis Review
Wisconsin's criminal incest statute does not advance a "legitimate
government interest." Further, Wisconsin's statute does not have a
rational basis to support it. The three primary justifications for crimi-
nal incest laws are genetic concerns, prevention of abuse, and moral-
ity. Wisconsin's law serves none of them. As shown, Wisconsin's
statute is not grounded in morality or prevention of abuse. It is a pure
genetic defect prevention statute. When viewed in that sense, it is
reminiscent of the now-discredited remark from Justice Oliver Wen-
dell Holmes that "three generations of imbeciles are enough. '221
Moreover, Wisconsin's statute is buttressed not by contemporary ge-
netic and scientific knowledge, but by tired tropes and eugenic theo-
ries.222 If Allen and Patty Muth can be imprisoned for years in a
maximum security prison for creating children with a speculatively in-
creased risk of health concerns, then Wisconsin ought to invest heavily
in its prison system for parents with heart disease, diabetes, and de-
pression. That the Muths' four children are not deformed or disabled
speaks volumes. For a rational basis to be rational it must not be bi-
ased.2 23 Where discrimination is implicated, rationality review re-
quires careful, skeptical scrutiny; arbitrariness cannot be the firm
foundation which provides the rationale to lock people up and take
away their children.2 24
G. Judge Evans' Concurrence
In his concurrence, Judge Evans expressed his own displeasure with
the position advanced by Allen Muth, stating that Muth's argument
221. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927). The Court stated its view on genetics:
We have seen more than once that the public welfare may call upon the best citizens for
their lives. It would be strange if it could not call upon those who already sap the
strength of the State for these lesser sacrifices, often not felt to be such by those con-
cerned, in order to prevent our being swamped with incompetence. It is better for all
the world, if instead of waiting to execute degenerate offspring for crime, or to let them
starve for their imbecility, society can prevent those who are manifestly unfit from con-
tinuing their kind. The principle that sustains compulsory vaccination is broad enough
to cover cutting the Fallopian tubes. Three generations of imbeciles are enough.
Id. (citation omitted).
222. See supra notes 200-215 and accompanying text.
223. Civil Liberties for Urban Believers v. City of Chicago, 342 F.3d 752, 768-69 (7th Cir.
2003) (Posner, J., dissenting).
224. Id. Judge Posner recognized this in the context of Equal Protection: "[D]iscrimination
against sensitive uses is to be given more careful, realistic, skeptical scrutiny by the courts than
discrimination against purely commercial activities." Id. at 769.
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"demeans the importance of [Lawrence's] holding. '225 He proceeded
to note that Lawrence did not extend to "things like prostitution, pub-
lic sex, nonconsensual sex, sex involving children, and certainly incest,
a condition universally subject to criminal prohibitions. ' 226 Undoubt-
edly, Judge Evans was correct so far as the first four varieties of sexual
conduct are concerned. But like the majority and the other propo-
nents of the slippery slope argument,227 he failed to grasp the funda-
mental difference between the first set of sexual acts in his parade of
horribles and consensual incest. 228 Legitimate, rational bases exist for
criminal sanction of all of those sexual acts, except adult consensual
incest. It is also curious that Judge Evans chose to refer to incestual
behavior as a "condition," which implies a status or state of being. It
is almost reminiscent of the fashion with which homosexuality was
viewed in the past, when it was deemed a psychological transvestitism
or "inversion" of one's sexual drive.229 Judge Evans' choice of lan-
guage highlights the court's apparent inability to address or compre-
hend what incest is and what it is not; that inability led to the court's
erroneous decision.230 Finally, it bears noting that Judge Evans
claimed that incest is "universally subject to criminal prohibitions. '231
Judge Evans provided no authority for such a dramatic statement, per-
225. Muth v. Frank, 412 F.3d 808, 819 (7th Cir.) (Evans, J., concurring), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct.
575 (2005).
226. Id.
227. For an excellent survey of slippery slope arguments, their use in legal analysis, and the
problems with them, see Frederick Schauer, Slippery Slopes, 99 HARV. L. REv. 361 (1985); Eu-
gene Volokh, The Mechanisms of the Slippery Slope, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1026 (2003). For an
analysis of slippery slope arguments in the context of Lawrence, see Ruth E. Sternglantz, Com-
ment, Raining on the Parade of Horribles: Of Slippery Slopes, Faux Slopes, and Justice Scalia's
Dissent in Lawrence v. Texas, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1097 (2005). For an article exploring the
slippery slope argument as it pertains specifically to incest, see Courtney Megan Cahill, Same-
Sex Marriage, Slippery Slope Rhetoric, and the Politics of Disgust: A Critical Perspective on Con-
temporary Family Discourse and the Incest Taboo, 99 Nw. U. L. REV. 1543 (2005).
228. Prostitution involves a commercial aspect distinguishing it from consensual incest. Public
sex implicates order and societal concerns not relevant to consensual incest occurring in the
bedroom. Nonconsensual sex, by definition, is distinguishable from consensual incest. Finally,
sex involving children is distinguishable because the existence of statutory rape laws at least
implies that sex with a child cannot be consensual in the eyes of the law.
229. See HAVELOCK ELLIS, STUDIES IN THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SEX (1942); HAVELOCK ELLIS &
JOHN ADDINGTON SYMONDS, SEXUAL INVERSION (Arno Press 1975) (1897); SIGMUND FREUD,
Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality (1905), in VII THE STANDARD EDITION OF THE COM-
PLETE PSYCHOLOGICAL WORKS OF SIGMUND FREUD (James Strachey trans., 1964); ISRAEL J.
GERBER, MAN ON A PENDULUM: A CASE HISTORY OF AN INVERT (1955).




haps because he could not.232 Incest is far from universally
criminalized. 233
When reflecting upon Judge Evans' concurrence, the truly interest-
ing comparison is not merely the legal analogies or distinctions be-
tween Lawrence and Muth. The real human experiences behind
Lawrence and Muth are even more telling than the sanitized rendi-
tions that appear in court opinions. The actual stories of the persons
involved in those two cases take a bit of the wind out of the sails of
Judge Evans' claim that Muth's argument "demeans" Lawrence.
Not much is known about the relationship between the two men
who sparked the decision in Lawrence.234 It appears that the two men
"may have been occasional sexual partners, but were not in a long-
term, committed relationship when they were arrested. '235 The two
men, John Geddes Lawrence and Tyron Garner, were apparently in-
troduced to each other by a man with whom Garner was romantically
involved. 236 Upon their arrest, the police found an apartment filled
with pornography.2 37 What is established is that the men were not
committed to each other, in the traditional sense of that word, and
were instead merely sexual partners.2 38
The facts in Muth, on the other hand, tell the story of a couple who
met, fell in love, and remained faithful to each other throughout their
relationship, including through the birth and rearing of their four chil-
dren. Certainly the Muths do not appear to have been the best of
parents; they also knowingly flouted a criminal law.239 The point of
the factual comparison is not to criticize or belittle the men involved
in the Lawrence decision or to valorize the Muths. Lawrence and
Garner were certainly entitled to express their consensual, private
desires and order their lives however they choose. But the notion put
forth by Judge Evans, that Allen Muth's argument somehow
"demeaned" the holding in Lawrence, is an insult made possible only
by au courant political correctness or a willful blindness to the facts.
Justice Kennedy's sweeping paean in Lawrence to an "intimacy" tran-
scending all "spatial bounds" 240 would seem more applicable to the
232. Id.
233. See supra notes 48-67 and accompanying text.
234. See Dale Carpenter, The Unknown Past of Lawrence v. Texas, 102 MICH. L. REv 1464
(2004).
235. Id. at 1478.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 1484.
238. See id. at 1478.
239. See generally Voll, supra note 113.
240. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003).
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love and devotion between Patty and Allen Muth than the right to
have casual sex.
If sodomy laws are wrong because they "punish" a person's expres-
sion of his or her sexual desires or romantic instincts, Wisconsin's
criminal incest statute is wrong for the same reason. The Muths'
crime, like that of homosexuals, is becoming intimate with the wrong
person. It is not suggested here that the Muths are in any way more
deserving of constitutional protection than the men in Lawrence. But
the assertion that Allen Muth's behavior demeans Garner's and Law-
rence's intimate liberty begs for a dispassionate analysis, however un-
comfortable it may be.
That homosexuality, unlike the act of incestuous sexual relations,
may not be a choice is irrelevant. Even if sexual orientation is not a
choice, engaging in a particular sexual practice certainly is. The issue
then is not homosexuality contra incest, it is sodomy contra incest.
Certainly one would not argue that the homosexual qua homosexual
is compelled or driven to a particular sex practice, namely sodomy,
compulsively. Indeed, most gay men do not practice anal sex exclu-
sively or even predominately.241 The Muths were free under Wiscon-
sin law to engage in other sexual acts, but could not cross that
Rubicon and engage in penile-vaginal intercourse, even if that inter-
course did not lead to seminal emission. 242 The Texas sodomy statute
and the Wisconsin incest statute are alike in that both punish behav-
iors, not conditions or orientations.243 In that limited sense, Justice
Scalia was correct when he sarcastically upbraided Justice O'Connor
for arguing that the Texas law was directed toward gay people as a
class: "A law against public nudity targets 'the conduct that is closely
correlated with being a nudist,' and hence 'is targeted at more than
conduct'; it is 'directed toward nudists as a class.' ,,244
It also bears commenting that the risk to the actual individuals en-
gaged in incestuous sexual acts is no greater than the risk to any other
heterosexual couple. Incest does not, by some mystical occurrence,
241. Studies indicate that anal sex is practiced by 45% to 50% of gay men, only 15% more
than heterosexuals. See William D. Moshe et al., Sexual Behavior and Selected Health Measures:
Men and Women 15-44 Years of Age, United States, 2002, ADVANCE DATA FROM VITAL &
HEALTH STAT. (Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Nat'l Ctr. for Health Statistics, Hyatts-
ville, Md.), Sept. 15, 2005, available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/ad/ad362.pdf.
242. See supra notes 134-136 and accompanying text; see also WiS. STAT. ANN. § 944.06 (West
2005).
243. Compare Wis. STAT. ANN. § 944.06, with TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.06(a) (2003).
244. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 601 (Scalia, J., dissenting); accord id. at 583 (O'Connor, J., concur-
ring) ("While it is true that the law applies only to conduct, the conduct targeted by this law is
conduct that is closely correlated with being homosexual. . . . It is ...directed toward gay
persons as a class.").
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cause any sexually transmitted disease or ailment. Unfortunately, the
actual health risk to the parties engaged in anal sex in Lawrence is
appreciable and real, even with the use of prophylactics.245 Any risk
coming from sexual intercourse between Allen and Patricia Muth
would only be to a potential offspring, and even that risk is speculative
and lower than many genetic risks permitted by states. 246
H. Sex & Handcuffs: The "Police Power"
Even if the court was unable to determine that Allen Muth's con-
sensual incest was a "liberty interest" protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment under Lawrence, it should have also inquired whether his
conduct was properly proscribable under Wisconsin's police power.
State regulation of private consensual sexual acts between consan-
guineous adults may be beyond the reach of the state's police power,
irrespective of a Fourteenth Amendment analysis. The traditional jus-
tification for invoking the police power has been to prevent harm.247
Private consensual incest between adults does not create the type of
harm that tends to justify the exercise of state power. The police
power should not proscribe behavior based on majoritarian notions of
morality or discredited science. Moreover, liberty is potentially inex-
haustible-its form, scope, and import vary from person to person and
from taste to taste. The police power is subject to limits. 248 Rather
than operating from the position that Muth must demonstrate to the
court that his "flavor" of liberty is "fundamental," the court should
ask if Muth's behavior is something the state may properly prohibit.249
Professor Randy Barnett wrote an amicus curiae brief in Lawrence v.
Texas, arguing that the Court should "ask whether the state's police
power extends this far, not whether the Defendants have a 'right' to
245. See generally GABRIEL ROTELLO, SEXUAL ECOLOGY: AIDS AND THE DESTINY OF GAY
MEN (1997); A.B. Chun et al., Anal Sphincter Structure and Function in Homosexual Males En-
gaging in Anoreceptive Intercourse, 92 AM. J. GASTROENTEROLOGY 465 (1997); Stephen E.
Goldstone & Mark L. Welton, Anorectal Sexually Transmitted Infections in Men Who Have Sex
with Men-Special Considerations for Clinicians, 17 CLINICS COLON & RECTAL SURGERY 235
(2004); AJ.G. Miles et al., Effect of Anoreceptive Intercourse on Anorectal Function, 86 J.
ROYAL SOC'Y MED. 144 (1993); P. Tilston, Anal Human Papillomavirus and Anal Cancer, 50 J.
CLINICAL PATHOLOGY 625 (1997).
246. See supra notes 200-215 and accompanying text.
247. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1051 (1992).
248. See, e.g., Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558 (invalidating state statute prohibiting homosexual
sodomy).
249. See generally RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMP-
TION OF LIBERTY (2004); Randy E. Barnett, The Proper Scope of the Police Power, 79 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 429 (2004); John M. Finnis, Law, Morality, and "Sexual Orientation," 69 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1049 (1994); Glenn H. Reynolds & David B. Kopel, The Evolving Police Power:
Some Observations for a New Century, 27 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 511 (2000).
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engage in the conduct at issue. '250 Barnett noted the problem with a
Fourteenth Amendment fundamental rights analysis:
[T]here are countless private activities that are protected by no tra-
dition or express constitutional provision. It would be unimaginable
that they could be prohibited in a free society, even if some objec-
tion could be raised to them-cooking unhealthy meals, staying up
too late, spending a slothful day drinking coffee and doing puzzles
instead of accomplishing something productive. Indeed, almost an-
ything an ordinary person might spend his or her weekend doing,
from gardening to cleaning to touching up house paint, would prob-
ably not qualify as a "fundamental" right. 251
Barnett argued that, in our American tradition, the power of govern-
ment is limited while the number of private liberties is not; moreover,
prevention of harm-not regulation of private morality-has been the
prime justification for invoking the government's ability to deploy the
police power.252
The "police power" analysis would, this Note argues, apply with
equal force to the issue of consensual adult incest. After having
shown the court that his liberty does not "harm" in the sense that
justifies police action, Muth should have been adjudged free to engage
in consensual sexual relations with his sister. The Seventh Circuit de-
cision, however, confined itself to a traditional Fourteenth Amend-
ment analysis. Had it engaged in the suggested analysis, it would have
been able to protect the liberty of Allen Muth without declaring the
conduct "fundamental."
V. IMPAcT
Muth was an incorrect decision in light of Lawrence, granting to the
state a police power inconsistent with the principles of this nation. Al-
len Muth's petition for certiorari was denied by the Supreme Court in
October 2005.253 His case is not likely to alter the jurisprudential
landscape. Unfortunately, the facts of his case likely made it a legal
"bridge too far" for the courts; the prospect of granting the jurispru-
dential imprimatur to sex between a brother and sister would give any
judge pause. But it would be a mistake to view Muth as an aberration.
Where a court of appeal may so blatantly distort precedent, the liberty
of all citizens stands at risk. The Muth decision may not garner much
public sympathy; it is unlikely anyone will recall Muth as the Dred
250. Brief of Institute for Justice as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at *3, Lawrence,
539 U.S. 558 (No. 02-102), 2003 WL 164140.
251. Id. at *5.
252. Id. at *6-13.
253. Muth v. Frank, 126 S. Ct. 575 (2005).
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Scott of the sexual realm. 254 But the tough, distasteful cases like Muth
call for the judiciary to act with reason and independence. When
courts fail to do this, the immediate detriment may extend only to the
individual parties to the case. The long-term structural detriment,
however, is more severe. Erosion of confidence in the courts is not to
be discounted. Whether gay sex, incestuous sex, or a case wholly un-
related to sex, where liberty is illegitimately limited, all are
impoverished.
The Muth decision, in addition to being poorly reasoned, was also
inordinately incorrect in light of public policy. There is a line of cases
and scholarship that draws upon the politico-philosophical thesis that
the state should not criminalize behavior absent harm to an identifi-
able entity.2 55 Consensual incest does not harm a person any more
than any other sexual relation might. Moreover, consensual incest dif-
fers in vital ways from exploitative incest. Exploitative incest can and
should be fully prosecuted by existing criminal laws. But consenting,
competent adults have a liberty interest in engaging in incestuous acts.
And Muth could lead to manifestly unjust results in more factually
sympathetic cases, such as those involving artificial reproductive tech-
nology (ART) 256 and multiple-father births.257
254. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
255. See generally Barnett supra note 81; see also supra note 249 and accompanying text.
256. The proliferation of ART makes it more than conjectural that in the near future, consan-
guineous men and women, initially oblivious to their genetic relationship, will meet and mate.
See Sheryl Gay Stolberg, For the Infertile, a High-Tech Treadmill, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 1997.
What these couples do will technically be incest, thus making their actions no different from
Allen and Patty Muth. The Muth decision may pose danger for these people. Major segments of
the population of Wisconsin and other states would be at risk for imprisonment, given the in-
creasing prevalence of ART.
According to the Centers for Disease Control (CDC), in 2002, approximately sixty-two million
American women were of reproductive age. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, As-
sisted Reproductive Technology, http://www.cdc.gov/ART/index.htm (last visited May 23, 2007).
In that same year, 115,392 ART procedures were reported to CDC. Victoria Clay Wright et al.,
Assisted Reproductive Technology Surveillance-United States, 2002, MORBIDITY & MORTALITY
WKLY. REP. (Dep't of Health & Human Servs., Atlanta, Ga.), June 3, 2005, at 5. Over 10% of
the ART procedures utilized genetic material from sources other than the mother. Id. at 1. And
the technology is growing: in a six-year span, the number of ART procedures performed in-
creased from 64,681 to 115,392. Id. The number of infants conceived through ART increased at
an even greater rate, growing by 120%, from 20,840 infants in 1996 to 45,751 in 2002. Id. at 8.
Increased use of these technologies will mean that increasing numbers of children will be born to
parents who have no genetic relationship to their children. The astounding growth of ART us-
age presages a very real time and place where consanguineous offspring will meet and procreate
without awareness of their genetic "closeness."
257. CDC statistics indicate that 1,415,995 live births occurred to unmarried women in 2003.
Joyce A. Martin, Births: Final Data for 2004, NAT'L VITAL STAT. REP. (Nat'l Ctr. for Health
Statistics), Sept. 29, 2006, at 11, available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr55/
nvsr55_01.pdf. The total percentage of all births that occur to unmarried women is 34.6%. Id. If
the trend of out-of-wedlock births remains static, without any further growth, one can easily
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Cases like Lawrence and Muth also have a very real potential to
impact other unrelated areas of law. It has been suggested that after
Lawrence, the Court had turned a corner toward recognizing a sphere
of personal liberty that the state could not violate absent identifiable
harm to others. 258 Indeed, Barnett has argued that the liberty interest
identified in Lawrence could go so far as to cover nonsexual activities
like medicinal marijuana use.259 One might uncover other activities
that fall within a person's liberty interest. Perhaps use of marijuana in
the general population, indeed general drug use, could fall under the
Lawrence rubric. If Lawrence means what it appears to mean, then
certainly an argument can be made that engaging in recreational drug
use in the home is within a person's liberty interest. Expressions of
intimacy through sex, as Lawrence noted, are no doubt meaningful
and highly personal. But why should the Court limit liberty to the
libidinous? Again, Lawrence is not merely a case about sodomy, it is a
case embracing and endorsing the liberty interest of each person to
define what is meaningful in life and act upon it.
Muth, however, provides the courts of appeal shelter to continue
marginalizing both sexual and behavioral minorities. Muth could have
marked a shining example of the courts taking seriously the holding in
Lawrence, a choice of liberty over loathing. Instead, the opportunity
was squandered. Contrary to Judge Evans' concurring opinion, it was
the Seventh Circuit that has "demeaned" Lawrence. It is incest this
envision another subset of children who may potentially reach adulthood and, like the children
of ART procedures noted above, meet and mate with consanguineous partners.
While one criticism of consensual incest focuses on the genetic risks to the children of a con-
sanguineous pairing, little attention is paid to the risks facing women who bear children by multi-
ple fathers. These women bear a higher risk for, among other things, an accelerated diagnosis of
multiple sclerosis. Olga Basso et al., Multiple Sclerosis in Women Having Children by Multiple
Partners: A Population-Based Study in Denmark, 10 MULTIPLE SCLEROSIs 621 (2004). Multiple
partner-father changes may also subject the mother herself to increased pre-eclampsia risks.
Olga Basso et al., Higher Risk of Pre-eclampsia After Change of Partner: An Effect of Longer
Interpregnancy Intervals?, 12 EPIDEMIOLOGY 624 (2001). Another study also noted that
"[w]omen who had children with different men had a higher mortality than women who had the
same number of children with the same man." Jorn Olsen et al., Studying Health Consequences
of Microchimerism: Methodological Problems in Studying Health Effects of Procreation with
Multiple Partners, 18 EUR. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 623, 625 (2003). If health and genetic concerns are
the important government interests that states like Wisconsin portray them to be, one wonders
whether the legislators in Madison will now see fit to criminalize giving birth to children by
different fathers.
258. See Barnett, supra note 81, at 41. Barnett noted that persons seeking to distribute medic-
inal marijuana would be greatly benefited by an expansive reading of Lawrence if they "did not
have to show that their liberty to do so was somehow 'fundamental'-and instead the govern-
ment were forced to justify its restrictions on that liberty." Id.
259. Barnett appeared pro bono before the Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals for oral arguments in a case involving medicinal marijuana. See Gonzales v. Raich, 545
U.S. 1 (2005); Raich v. Ashcroft, 352 F.3d 1222 (9th Cir. 2004).
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year, but it could conceivably be any "deviant," "perverse," or margi-
nal behavior next year.
VI. CONCLUSION
The decision in Muth is an unfortunate example of the persistent
inability and unwillingness by the courts to come to grips with human
sexuality. In cases like Muth, a traditional Fourteenth Amendment
"fundamental rights" analysis should be just one facet of a more thor-
ough and holistic approach. The problem with Fourteenth Amend-
ment analysis is that it begins from a first principle at odds with the
raison d'etre of this nation. A better approach for the courts would be
to engage in a form of "police power" analysis. Such an analysis is not
moored to the text of the Constitution; instead, it presumes the liberty
and autonomy of action that the Lawrence case comes closest to em-
bodying. This form of analysis appreciates that people engage in nu-
merous and varied behaviors that could never be deemed
"fundamental," but are nonetheless basic to the individual. Until
those behaviors place another person at risk, the state should refrain
from criminally sanctioning them. Courts should thus begin with a
presumption that the behavior should not be criminalized, instead of
beginning from the defensive posture that people can only be pro-
tected if the right implicated is somehow "fundamental."
Under either analysis, the conduct of Allen and Patty Muth is
within that sphere of liberty which all citizens enjoy. No real rationale
exists for criminalizing their private, consensual, adult sexual acts.
The justifications of abuse, morality, and genetics all fail, and the law
cannot proscribe behavior solely on the basis of visceral disgust or
displeasure.
Love is a passionate and profound area of mankind's existence.
The criminal law is ill-equipped to enter into such an area, and it
should probably not attempt to do so absent realistic harm to another
person. A great chronicler of the vagaries of human love, Tennessee
Williams, once wrote, "A line can be straight, or a street, but the
human heart . . . it's curved like a road through mountains. ' 260 One
day, courts will fully grasp the meaning of that simple but ineluctable
fact of life, and they will leave people to live and love as their liberty
dictates. The criminal law should never play the role of moral censor
260. TENNESSEE WILLIAMS, A STREETCAR NAMED DESIRE (1947).
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or matchmaker. Absent legitimate harm to another, the law should
respect the individual's "right to be let alone. 261
Brendan J. Hammer*
261. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Justice
Louis Brandeis put it eloquently:
The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions favorable to the pursuit
of happiness. They recognized the significance of man's spiritual nature, of his feelings
and of his intellect. They knew that only a part of the pain, pleasure and satisfactions of
life are to be found in material things. They sought to protect Americans in their be-
liefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations. They conferred, as against the
Government, the right to be let alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the right
most valued by civilized men.
Id.
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